International Legal Framework Governing Prosecution on the National Level
State action regarding the prosecution of children who are suspected to have committed war crimes is constrained by IHL and IHRL norms, 27 both legal regimes applying in times of armed conflict. 26 This article does not examine issues such as the trial itself or the sentencing if the child is found guilty but focuses on whether prosecution is lawful and, if so, suitable. 27 To some extent international criminal law also imposes duties upon the State but to a lesser extent. Therefore international criminal law will be used in this article as a tool to establish customary international law, rather than as the legal framework governing prosecution on the national level.
International humanitarian law regulates conduct in armed conflict. The GCs and AP I which apply in situations of international armed conflict provide for a mandatory enforcement mechanism for state parties to investigate and prosecute individuals having forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. They must also investigate other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects', irrespective of the nature of the armed conflict. 30 It can thus be argued that States have the duty to investigate alleged war crimes and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects and these could include child soldiers. Nonetheless, IHL does not create a criminal system to prosecute those who violate it. As the 'grave breaches provisions in the Geneva Conventions are … insufficiently detailed to work on their own as a criminal code' 31 it is left to the States to implement national legislation. 28 The interaction between IHL and IHRL is the subject of much wrangling, ranging from the application of the lex specialis to a system of complementarity. See when children are tried the process be fair and take into account their specific needs and vulnerabilities whilst the non-binding Beijing Rules, which spell out standard minimum rules for the administration of juvenile justice, provide for a more elaborate set of norms applicable to trials of juvenile offenders.
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None of the international instruments dealing with the prosecution of children/juveniles set an age for criminal responsibility in national courts though. 49 Whilst it is recognized that the 'determination of "child" or "adult" is a social construction that may be difficult to define … in order to define specific rights … the age for childhood and adulthood requires certainty.' 50 An assessment on a case-by-case basis would be difficult as it would require ascertaining the intellectual development of children at the time they committed the crime, bearing in mind that all children mature at different rates. 51 As the Committee on the Rights of the Child explained, the assessment of a children's criminal responsibility should not be based on 'criteria of subjective or arbitrary nature (such as with regard to the attainment of puberty, the age of discernment or the personality of the child set an age for majority that is in line with cultural and social norms. It is in this vein that the setting of an age for criminal responsibility must be understood.
Obviously IHRL does not consider children as innocent per se; they are responsible for their acts once they have reached the minimum age of criminal liability.
As the UNCRC makes no specific references to crimes perpetrated in armed conflict it 54 Ottenhof, ' 64 See discussions in UNHCHR, supra note 36, at 800-804. 65 The formulation in Article 6(3) of the Optional Protocol ('persons within their jurisdiction recruited or used in hostilities contrary to this Protocol') also covers individuals who were children at the time of their recruitment or use but are adults at the time of the demobilization process. were present in relation to the prosecution of Khadr: the US had a fully functioning judicial system, there were laws that could be used to prosecute individuals for war crimes, the number of persons to prosecute was not overwhelming, the financial and political focus was not on reconstruction and rehabilitation, etc. Given that Khadr was prosecuted it appears that such factors are indeed relevant in influencing the State's decision to prosecute children for war crimes. If that is true then the decision is one based on political and financial considerations rather than on the belief of a legal obligation that
States are not allowed to prosecute children for war crimes.
It must be remembered that in the wake of the conflict in Afghanistan a number of children were apprehended by the American armed forces, 20 of which were detained in Guantanamo Bay and then in Camp Iguana, a special camp created for detainees between the age of 13 and 15. 96 They were quickly released to UNICEF in Afghanistan for rehabilitation. 97 Khadr was not the only child to be kept in Guantanamo Bay; two other boys, Mohamed Jawad and Mohammad El Gharani, both aged 16 were treated as, and 93 As stated by Park, Khadr is 'simultaneously cast as an object of sympathy and suspicion, reflecting the dyadic social construction of children as both innocent and evil'. State practice at national level shows that the permissive rule is used and thus does not support the view that there is a practice relating to the prohibition of prosecution of children for war crimes. That being said it seems that in a post-conflict restorative context on the African continent there is a trend towards the prohibition of prosecution. Yet, even in this very specific context, no opinio juris supporting the emergence of a customary norm can be established with certainty.
B. Prosecution at International Level
Another way to determine the position of States in relation to the prosecution of children who have committed war crimes is to survey the statutes of various international criminal tribunals as they were drafted by States. The Statutes of neither the ICTY nor the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) specify a minimum age for prosecution, a lack that might be due to the fact that few children were involved in the hostilities in Yugoslavia and that the involvement of children in the conflict in Rwanda was less known. Moreover, the ICTR Prosecutor decided not to prosecute children 101 .
The ICTY and ICTR statutes apply to 'persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law' 102 and could theoretically be used to prosecute children. criminal prosecution of children generally praised the ICC Statute for fixing the age at this level whilst acknowledging that it is not rare for children to commit such crimes. 106 It must be stressed that the decision not to prosecute individuals under the age of 18 was taken as a matter of policy rather than law. Indeed the ICC should only focus on the worst instances 107 and when such crimes are committed on a mass scale. 108 The combination of these provisions means that it would be difficult to mount a prosecution against a child before the ICC. The travaux préparatoires confirm such policy based decision. The drafters discussed two proposals relating to the age of criminal responsibility. The first option, which was adopted, excluded all those under 18 at the time the crime was committed from the jurisdiction of the Court. The second option established a presumption of exclusion for such individuals but would have allowed in exceptional circumstances for their prosecution provided they were older than 16 and the Court had 'determined that the person was capable of understanding the unlawfulness of his or her conduct at the time the crime was committed.' 109 The main bone of contention in this formulation was that it introduced a subjective criterion i.e. whether the child was able to understand that it behaved in an unlawful manner. 110 In the end '[e]xclusion of children from the ICC jurisdiction avoided an argument between States on the minimum age for international crimes.' 111 In fact such a jurisdictional bar 'represents the absence of an international consensus on th[e] issue and was indicative of a political compromise rather
Keeping the Permissive Rule
Whilst children are rarely, if ever, prosecuted for war crimes, States' decision to not prosecute children on the national and international level is policy-based. States that emerge from an armed conflict often receive assistance from the international community that insists on carrying out a DDR process whereby children, alike adults, are rehabilitated. 125 States needing such help are happy to oblige all the more as their priority is to restore peace and security in the country and use wisely the few resources they have. 
A. The Post-Conflict Context
It appears that the key element in the States' decision not to prosecute children for war crimes relates to the post-conflict context rather than the age of the alleged offender.
Despite States' obligation to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute all alleged war criminals it is recognized that following an armed conflict that has ravaged the indigenous community it is most suitable to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate former combatants. 127 As a result, children enjoy the same immunity as adults, and only the most responsible or those who have committed the most egregious crimes (should) face justice.
conflict justice, the ICTY explained that its mandate and duty was 'to deter such crimes and to combat impunity. It is not only right that punitur quia peccatur (the individual must be punished because he broke the law) but also punitur ne peccatur (he must be punished so that he and others will no longer break the law It is submitted that a system of triage could be used to determine which method of accountability is best suited. In light of the previous findings two situations must be case, as explained earlier, prosecution would be seen as last resort and the primary focus would be on the best interests of the child.
Absent such a post-conflict mechanism the twin aims of deterring future crimes and punishing former crimes are unlikely to be met and the community might feel that justice has not been done. In such a case alternative mechanisms of accountability within the juvenile rehabilitative model of justice must be used.
The central feature of this system is that the justice response is embedded into the community's needs and interests. 153 The collective aspects of the child's reintegration into a community ravaged by war should be not overlooked. At the same time it must be borne in mind that poor acceptance in the community increases the likelihood of child soldiers showing negative social behaviour and their levels of emotional distress. 154 Therefore it is also in the child's best interests to return to the community. It is not a paternalistic approach denying the child's agency but a communal response that is likewise suited for adult offenders in this specific context. Yet, the communal response must be guided by international law which clearly demands that the best interests of the child be taken into consideration.
In other situations (eg 1. international armed conflicts, 2. cases where children are removed from combat zones, transferred to another country where their crimes are being investigated, 3. Children refugees, etc.), where a post-conflict restorative model of justice is not used or not suitable, States ought to be able to decide on whether to prosecute children, this time heed being paid to their best interests (rehabilitative juvenile justice)
since the need to take into account the collective and restorative aspects of post-conflict justice have, albeit not entirely, dissipated.
This brings it back to contending that the prosecution is directed at educating children or at making them understand that they acted wrongfully. Prosecution is thus particularly suited in two cases: when the child is unwilling to take part in a restorative justice mechanism and/or when the child is one of the 'most responsible' individuals or has committed the 'most serious crimes'. The application of such thresholds permits the prosecution by national and international judicial authorities of children who have risen in the ranks of the armed group/forces. 155 Such thresholds work well: they work for the community -restoring a sense of justice -and for the children -sending a message that the behaviour they have embraced 156 is reprehensible. The aim of prosecuting children is to make them understand that their acts are morally and legally reprehensible 157 and that they should not continue on this path.
If we acknowledge that children can and should be prosecuted for war crimes then, as war crimes are universal in nature, a universal age of criminal responsibility should be set. We should not leave it to the State or indigenous community to decide on who is a child. 158 After all 'in prosecuting international crimes States are acting not only on their own behalf but also as agents of the international community'. 159 Further the age of criminal responsibility for war crimes should not depend on where the individual is prosecuted, for war crimes are international crimes that warrant an universal stance. 160 The age should be set at 16 for mainly two reasons. First the Optional Protocol allows States to permit voluntary recruitment in the armed forces, provided they raise their minimum age from that set out in Article 38(3) UNCRC, ie set it at 16 years of age as a minimum. As 159 States are parties and 14 signatories to the Optional Protocol it imposes a clear standard. 161 Second the proposal under the ICC Statute was 16, again raising the threshold that was set by the Special Court for Sierra Leone at 15. The division of views discussed during the ICC negotiations was whether 16 or 18 years should be the age of criminal liability. Given that 18 is not universally accepted, agreeing on 16 years of age appears to be a solution susceptible to be widely accepted.
Conclusion
Much has been written about the plight of child soldiers. But in people's mind the 'classical' abducted child soldier is as a boy with an AK47 embroiled in an African conflict which he does not comprehend (eg Ishmael Beah). 162 The child is a victim and crimes. These are the children who need to fully understand that their acts were reprehensible and be prosecuted.
The latter children are more likely to be prosecuted, unless alternative mechanisms are devised -especially for those who have not committed the most egregious crimes or are most responsible for such crimes but yet show no sign of remorse or understanding -because the society does not act as a buffer between the child and a strict, almost mechanical, application of criminal law.
In particular, outside a post-conflict justice model where the community tries to come to terms with past atrocities this buffer does not exist at all. There is no 'understanding' of the acts perpetrated by child soldiers and no willingness to understand either. There is little doubt that the children shown on ISIS videos, should they return back to their States of nationality or residency, will be prosecuted (though not necessarily for war crimes). But this should not be a case of automaticity. In this context the States need to pay heed to the best interests of the child and their actions should be solely guided by this core principle of international child law.
As Michael Newton has been quoted to say 'more and more child soldiers are being recruited, and they are committing heinous crimes. This is an issue the international community is going to have to confront'. 164 Whilst there is no customary norm prohibiting the prosecution of children who have committed war crimes, States' discretion should be limited. First, prosecution should be limited to extreme cases only:
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(1) those who refuse to take part in a post-conflict restorative accountability mechanism and thus refuse to acknowledge their crimes and (2) those who are 'most responsible' or have committed the 'most serious crimes'. The aim is educational, making them understand that what they have done is wrong and that such behaviour cannot be tolerated, thereby ensuring that in the future they will not follow a criminal path on the basis that such behaviour is tolerated. Second, no one should be prosecuted for war crimes committed under the age of 16.
